The European digital economy and urban legal systems are witnessing an acute structural friction between platform oversight and fundamental constitutional guarantees.
Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 on data collection and sharing relating to short-term accommodation rental services officially entered into application to create an interoperable, transparent data exchange mechanism across the European Union.
Its provisions establish uniform registration procedures for hosts, automated monthly transaction reporting to national Single Digital Entry Points (SDEPs), and continuous data feeds to national and local authorities.
On paper, the Regulation is an administratively neutral transparency exercise designed to furnish municipalities with evidence-based data for urban planning. In regulatory practice, however, Member States and local administrations are converting this technological reporting grid into an enforcement instrument to erect severe entry restrictions, municipal moratoria, and outright operational bans - such as Barcelona’s scheduled 2028 elimination of tourist licenses and aggressive municipal quotas across Italian historic centers linked to the National Identification Code (CIN) under Decree-Law 145/2023.
This development is not a critique of regulatory oversight per se, nor does it seek to defend platform operators. Rather, it exposes how public authorities are utilizing digital compliance mandates to obscure their own policy defaults, shifting the systemic costs of housing shortages onto private citizens and individual property owners in violation of core constitutional protections.
The Constitutional Dimension: Multi-Layered Infringements of Fundamental Rights
While public debates often focus narrowly on market freedoms, the systematic restriction of short-term rental activity engages foundational principles across both European primary law and national constitutions:
The Right to Property and the Limits of its Social Function (Article 17 CFREU; Article 42 Italian Constitution): Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) enshrines the right to enjoy and dispose of lawfully acquired property, mandating that any deprivation or subordinate restriction must serve the public interest, be governed by clear legal rules, and provide fair compensation.
Article 42, paragraph 2, of the Italian Constitution recognizes private property and charges ordinary legislation with ensuring its "social function" (funzione sociale). However, authoritative civil and constitutional doctrine (see Gambaro, La proprietà edilizia, Giuffrè, 2017) has long affirmed that the social function cannot be stretched to extinguish the essential economic substance of ownership, “ius utendi et fruendi”.
Imposing prohibitive caps or indefinitely denying owners the ability to generate revenue from their assets transforms property into a public utility by decree without indemnification, shifting the state's housing obligations onto private citizens.
The Principle of Proportionality and Subsidiarity (Article 52(1) CFREU; Article 5(4) TEU): Under Article 52(1) CFREU, any limitation on Charter rights must be strictly necessary, provided for by law, and genuinely meet objectives of general interest.
In Joined Cases C-724/18 and C-727/18, Cali Apartments SCI and HX v Procureur général près la cour d'appel de Paris, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) acknowledged that combating a shortage of long-term housing constitutes an overriding reason relating to the public interest (raison impérieuse d'intérêt général).
Crucially, however, the Court subjected municipal licensing regimes to Articles 9 and 10 of Directive 2006/123/EC (Services Directive), requiring that authorization criteria be proportionate, clear, objective, non-discriminatory, and made public in advance. When local authorities enact sweeping restrictions or municipal bans without empirical evidence demonstrating that short-term rentals are the decisive cause of market tightness, the measures fail the European proportionality test.
Equality Before the Law and Non-Discrimination (Articles 20 and 21 CFREU; Article 3 Italian Constitution): Imposing asymmetric burdens and strict quantitative quotas on non-professional, independent hosts while exempting traditional hospitality conglomerates creates an arbitrary regulatory distortion.
Under Article 3 of the Italian Constitution (substantive equality and reasonableness, “ragionevolezza”), regulatory classifications must be objectively justified. Restricting individual property owners while leaving major hotel operators unconstrained introduces market-distorting privileges and penalizes small-scale savings.
Freedom of Enterprise and Contractual Autonomy (Article 16 CFREU; Article 41 Italian Constitution): Article 16 CFREU guarantees the freedom to conduct a business, mirrored in Article 41 of the Italian Constitution protecting private economic initiative.
While economic activity may be coordinated with social utility, constitutional jurisprudence (see Cassese, La nuova costituzione economica, Laterza, 2021) establishes that regulatory intervention cannot destroy the freedom of contractual choice. Forcing an owner into a binary dilemma between long-term leases with high legal default risks or leaving the property empty breaches private autonomy.
Economic Incentives and Policy Deficits: The Scapegoating of Private Ownership
The prevailing political narrative attributes residential rental scarcity exclusively to the expansion of short-term rental platforms. This argument ignores basic economic incentives. Property owners do not transition to flexible short-term leasing merely for marginal revenue gains; they do so to escape structural dysfunctions within the ordinary residential tenancy market.
In Italy, residential leasing under Law 431/1998 exposes landlords to profound structural risks. Judicial eviction proceedings (sfratto per morosità) take between 18 and 24 months to execute in major metropolitan courts, during which the owner incurs substantial legal expenses, receives zero rental income, and remains liable for property and municipal taxes.
Concurrently, the flat tax (cedolare secca) on short-term rentals was increased to 26% for properties beyond the first (Budget Law 2024), narrowing tax advantages. Short-term rentals mitigate credit risk through automated advance escrow payments, guarantee periodic possession, and minimize the threat of protracted non-payment.
Restricting short-term rentals does not automatically channel secondary residences into affordable long-term leases. As empirical urban economics literature demonstrates (Koster, van Ommeren & Volkhausen, Short-term rentals and the housing market, Journal of Urban Economics, 2021), blanket bans or strict quotas typically result in properties being withdrawn from the market entirely, reserved for private family use, or pushed into untracked informal markets. The primary outcome is an artificial protection of the incumbent hotel sector and the persistence of high prices, leaving the structural roots of housing deficits untouched.
Comparative Governance Frameworks
Jurisdiction
Regulatory Model
Mechanisms & Operational Rules
Market & Policy Outcomes
European Union
(Regulation 2024/1028 & Directive 2006/123/EC)
Standardized Algorithmic Transparency & SDEP Integration
Mandatory national registration numbers, automated monthly platform reporting to Single Digital Entry Points. Discretion over local zoning preserved within CJEU proportionality standards.
Risk of decentralized protectionism as municipalities use reporting data to enforce blanket bans (e.g., Barcelona 2028) and restrictive quotas without addressing housing supply.
United States
(New York City - Local Law 18)
Prohibitionist Municipal Registration
Rigid registration criteria, prohibition of whole-unit rentals under 30 days, mandatory host presence during stays, prohibition of internal locks.
Two years post-enforcement, residential rents in Manhattan and Brooklyn hit historic highs; hotel rates escalated sharply; affordable housing inventory saw negligible expansion.
Japan
(Minpaku Act - Act No. 65 of 2017)
National Co-Regulatory Framework
Statutory right to rent up to 180 nights per year via administrative notification (todokede), mandatory certified management operators, and clear safety compliance.
Preserves private property utility while containing neighborhood externalities; provides a transparent, predictable national rulebook without arbitrary municipal bans.
Singapore
(Urban Redevelopment Authority)
High-Density Supply-Backed Planning
Three-month minimum rental period for private housing; short-term stays prohibited in public Housing & Development Board (HDB) estates.
Effective because restrictions are backed by structural state housing delivery: over 80% of resident households own publicly developed HDB flats.
Policy Recommendations for European Decision-Makers
To establish a coherent urban and housing strategy that respects European internal market principles and constitutional guarantees, policy makers must move beyond administrative restrictions:
Separate Data Transparency from Restrictionist Zoning: Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 must be maintained as a tool for statistical monitoring, building safety, and tax compliance, rather than an automated trigger for discretionary municipal bans.
Reform Civil Judicial Enforcement: Accelerate summary eviction processes for rent defaults in standard leases, restoring contractual confidence and encouraging small property owners to enter the long-term rental market.
Introduce Balanced Long-Term Rental Incentives: Provide targeted tax relief and legal certainty for long-term residential contracts instead of applying punitive fiscal surcharges on property.
Invest in Public and Student Housing: Expand social housing stock and student accommodations through public-private partnerships, addressing the structural supply deficit rather than attempting to resolve public infrastructure shortages through private property restrictions.
4. Primary Normative and Jurisprudential Sources
European Union (European Parliament and Council): Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 of 11 April 2024 on data collection and sharing relating to short-term accommodation rental services and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724, Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 2024. Available at: eur-lex.europa.eu.
European Union: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), Official Journal C 326, 2012. Relevant provisions: Article 16 (Freedom to conduct a business), Article 17 (Right to property), Article 20 (Equality before the law), Article 21 (Non-discrimination), Article 52 (Scope and interpretation of rights and principles).
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU): Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 September 2020, Joined Cases C-724/18 and C-727/18, Cali Apartments SCI and HX v Procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris and Ville de Paris, ECLI:EU:C:2020:743. Available at: curia.europa.eu.
European Parliament and Council: Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market (Services Directive), Official Journal L 376, 2006. Articles 9, 10, 14, and 15 (Requirements for authorization schemes and prohibited requirements).
Repubblica Italiana: Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana, Articles 3 (Principle of equality and reasonableness), 41 (Freedom of private economic initiative), 42 (Private property and social function), and 97 (Good administration and impartiality).
Repubblica Italiana: Decreto-Legge 18 ottobre 2023, n. 145, convertito con modificazioni dalla Legge 15 dicembre 2023, n. 191, Articolo 13-ter (Disciplina delle locazioni per finalità turistiche, delle locazioni brevi e del Codice Identificativo Nazionale - CIN). Available at: normattiva.it.
City of New York: Short-Term Rental Registration Law (Local Law 18 of 2022), NYC Administrative Code, Title 26, Chapter 31. Available at: nyc.gov.
Government of Japan: Housing Accommodation Business Act (Act No. 65 of 2017 - Minpaku Act). English translation available via the Ministry of Justice at: japaneselawtranslation.go.jp.
Singapore Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA): Planning Act - Residential Property Guidelines on Short-Term Accommodation. Available at: ura.gov.sg.
5. Academic and Doctrinal References
Koster, H. R., van Ommeren, J., & Volkhausen, N. (2021): Short-term rentals and the housing market: Quasi-experimental evidence from Airbnb in Los Angeles, Journal of Urban Economics, 124, 103356.
Gambaro, A. (2017): La proprietà edilizia, Trattato di diritto civile e commerciale, Giuffrè Francis Lefebvre, Milano.
Cassese, S. (2021): La nuova costituzione economica, Laterza, Roma-Bari.
Furiosi, E. (2025): Il Regolamento UE 2024/1028 sulle locazioni brevi e l'impatto sulla disciplina nazionale, Rivista Eurojus.